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Better Lucky Than Good 
N eal D evins 
f HIGH SCHOOL AND in law schooL I played a lot of poker. Through thou-sands of hours of observation, I con-
cluded that some of my friends were blessed 
with good luck and others cursed with bad 
luck. For the fortunate, improbable odds did 
not stand in their way of drawing the cards 
needed for a winning hand. For the unfor-
tunate, their drawing a good hand invariably 
meant that someone else had drawn an even 
better hand. 
After teaching constitutional law for sev-
enteen years, I have come to realize that the 
"better lucky than good" adage is surpris-
ingly relevant to Supreme Court lawyering. 
Indeed, luck, not skilled advocacy, has played 
a defining role in several landmark Supreme 
Court decisions. Prominent examples in-
clude Brown v. Board, Roe v. Wade, and, 
more recently, Rehnquist Court decisions 
upholding affirmative action and allowing 
foreign nationals and enemy combatants 
to challenge the war against terror. In the 
pages that follow, I will explain how events 
that unfolded after the granting of certiorari 
in all these cases played a pivotal role in the 
Court's decision making. These events were 
outside the control of the litigants and, as 
such, fortuitously benefited one side at the 
expense of the other side. In my review of 
school desegregation and affirmative action, 
I will make a second point, namely: interest 
groups who make use of litigation strategies 
that take many years to unfold will either 
benefit or suffer from changes in popular 
and elected government attitudes towards 
their underlying cause. In the case of school 
desegregation, the NAACP reaped the ben-
efits of a multi-year litigation strategy; in the 
case of affirmative action, however, chang-
ing social norms cut against the Center for 
Individual Rights' systematic step-by-step 
litigation strategy. 
In advancing these propositions, I do 
not mean to suggest that a well-thought-
out litigation strategy does not improve 
one's chances of victory before the Court. 
Relatedly, it is certainly true that advocates 
sometimes undermine their cases by advanc-
ing arguments that neither the American 
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people nor the Justices are ready to accept. 1 
My point, instead, is that out-of-Court de-
velopments playa surprisingly large role in 
shaping Court decision making. 
Let me begin with the Brown decisions. 
Brown's declaration that "the doctrine of 
separate but equal has no place" in public 
education is widely attributed to the NAACP'S 
"step-by-step assault on segregation in educa-
tion, which began in the mid-1930'S with a 
series of cases against all-white professional 
schools:'2 In these cases, the NAACP did not 
ask the courts to end racial segregation; in-
stead, it argued that the state could remedy 
inequality by spending money on "unequal" 
all-black schools. By chipping away at the 
foundations of "separate but equal;' these 
cases were seen as necessary building blocks 
to the Court's dismantling of segregation in 
public education. 
No doubt, the NAACP'S litigation strategy 
was masterful. Its principal virtue, however, 
was that it took the NAACP twenty years to 
ask the Court to undo racial segregation in 
the public schools. During that time, there 
was a basic rethinking of the propriety of ra-
cial segregation by both the public and elect-
ed government. In the 1940S, FOR issued an 
executive order institutionalizing fair em-
ployment practices and Harry Truman de-
segregated the military. Also, the Truman ad-
ministration filed a powerful brief in Brown, 
expressing "concern about the effects of u.s. 
race discrimination on Cold War foreign 
relations:'3 Public opinion matched these 
Truman administration initiatives. In 1942, 
two-thirds of white adults supported public 
school segregation. When Brown was decid-
ed, Americans supported the Court's ruling 
by a 54% to 41% margin.4 Commenting on 
the impact of these dramatic changes in race 
relations, Justice Felix Frankfurter remarked 
that had the segregation cases been brought 
in the mid-1940s, he would have sustained 
segregation's constitutionality because "pub-
lic opinion had not then crystalized against 
ir:'5 
The question remains: why do I say that 
the NAACP was lucky, not good? The fact 
that race relations underwent a sea change 
in the decades before Brown does not mean 
that the NAACP was not monitoring these 
developments. After all, · perceived public 
hostility towards school desegregation fig-
ured prominently in the NAACP'S decision 
to pursue a step-by-step litigation strategy. 
Moreover, by securing high profile victo-
ries in professional school cases, the NAACP 
educated both the public and the Court 
about the evils of segregation. For reasons 
I will now detail, however, I think that the 
NAACP'S victory in Brown was an accident of 
fortuitous timing. 
In 1950, the Supreme Court decided 
Sweatt v. Painter, a challenge to the all-white 
University of Texas law school. By conclud-
ing that intangible factors affect education, 
including "reputation, ... traditions, and pres-
I Lou Fisher and 1, for example, have written about the causal connection between the Truman admin-
istration's claim that presidential war making power is unreviewable and the Court's repudiation of 
Truman's efforts to seize the steel mills during the Korean War. See Neal Devins ~ Louis Fisher, lhe 
Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?, 19 CONST. COMMENTARY 63 (2002). See also infra notes 33-40 
(discussing Bush administration legal arguments in 2004 war on terror cases). 
2 Jack Greenberg, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 5 (1994), See also Richard Kluger, SIMPLE JUSTICE 
(1975). 
Mary Dudziak, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 27 (2000). See also Phillip A. Klinker with Rogers Smith, 
THE UNSTEADY MARCH 217-21 (1999). 
4 Hazel Gaudet Erskine, The Polls: Race Relations, 26 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 137 (1962). 
34 
Memorandum of William O . Douglas in Melvin 1. Urofsky. ed., THE DOUGLAS LETTERS: SELECTIONS 
FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS (1987). 
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tige;'6 Sweatt convinced the NAACP that the 
Supreme Court was ready to rule against seg-
regated public education. Correspondingly, 
the NAACP decided that "no relief other than" 
"obtaining education on a nonsegregated ba-
sis" would be "acceptable" in future education 
cases.7 At that time, however, there is good 
reason to think that the Supreme Court was 
not ready to strike down public school seg-
regation. 
When Brown was argued in 1952, Chief 
Justice Fred Vinson supported school seg-
regation. Moreover, according to Justice 
William O. Douglas's conference notes, the 
Justices were set to vote 5-4 to uphold segre-
gated education.s The NAACP, in other words, 
was overambitious in their timing. Rather 
than ask the Court to invalidate public 
school segregation in the immediate wake of 
Sweatt, they should have waited for a further 
coalescing of support for their position. But 
this bit of bad lawyering (if you can call it 
that) proved irrelevant to the Court's ruling 
in Brown. The reason: good luck. 
After hearing Brown, the Court held the 
case over for reargument so that it could also 
decide the constitutionality of segregated 
education in the "federal city;' Washington, 
D.C. The following September, Vinson 
died; his replacement was Governor Earl 
Warren - an occurrence prompting Justice 
Felix Frankfurter to exclaim: "[TJhis is the 
first solid piece of evidence I've ever had that 
there really is a God:'9 Warren, a skilled poli-
tician, patiently led a badly divided Court to 
unanimity in Brown.!O 
6 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950). 
7 Kluger, supra note 2 at 293. 
8 William O. Douglas. THE COU RT YEARS " 3 (1980). 
Needless to say, NAACP litigators did not 
foresee that the Vinson Court might not 
be ready to validate their position (some-
thing foreseeable but outside their control). 
They also did not know that Brown would 
be held over and that the accompanying de-
lay would result in Warren taking over as 
Chief Justice (something that was not just 
uncontrollable but also unpredictable) . The 
reargument of Brown benefited the NAACP 
in another way. Not only did just-elected 
President Dwight Eisenhower appoint 
Warren, he also backed the NAACP position 
in the case. Notwithstanding his personal 
opposition to school desegregation, he felt 
pressure not to repudiate Truman adminis-
tration claims about the social desirability of 
desegregation. 
One other thing: even if the NAACP'S ex-
pertly crafted litigation strategy set the stage 
for Brown, what abour Brown II? The NAACP 
suffered a stinging defeat in that decision. 
The Court flat out rejected its argument that 
defendant school systems must be ordered to 
take immediate action to desegregate or be 
told a "day certain" for the complete deseg-
regation of their schools. Instead, the Court 
concluded that "varied local school problems" 
were best solved by lower court judges and 
"[sJchool authorities" and that delays associ-
ated with "problems related to administra-
tion" were to be expected. 11 By delegating 
the administration of school desegregation 
remedies to school boards and district court 
judges, "the South was audibly relieved by 
Brown II, a victory of sorts snatched from the 
9 Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Righrs Litigarion, 1946-60: 
An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 840 (1987). 
10 See Dennis]. Hutchinson, Unanimity in Desegregation : Decisionmaking in ,he Supreme Court, 1948-
1958,68 GEO. L.J. I (1979). For acl.ditional discussion of Eisenhower's disapproval of Brown, see Dennis 
J. Hutchinson, Perspectives on Brown, 8 GREEN BAG 20 43 (2004). 
" Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955) . 
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total defeat of only a year ago:'12 
The NAACP ought not to be faulted for los-
ing Brown II.Just as their victory in Brown was 
largely an accident of good timing, Brown II 
highlighted the Justices' disinclination to 
get too far ahead of the political branches. 
Earl Warren. in particular. knew that the 
Eisenhower administration would not pres-
sure southern states to implement ambitious 
desegregation remedies. Eisenhower per-
sonally intervened in the Brown II litigation, 
amending the government's brief to encour-
age the Court to take into account that the 
segregated lifestyles of many people had been 
based on more than fifty years of Supreme 
Court sanction. More strikingly, after invit-
ing Warren to dinner at the White House, 
Eisenhower justified southern resistance to 
school desegregation this way: "These are not 
bad people. All they are concerned about is 
to see that their sweet little girls are not re-
quired to sit alongside some big overgrown 
Negroes:'13 
Fast forward forty years: The Center for 
Individual Rights (CIR), a conservative pub-
lic interest law firm, sought to undo affir-
mative action by '(luplicat[ingJ" the success 
and techniques of "liberal groups such as 
the ACLu" and NAACP. 14 In particular, CIR en-
deavored to '(levelop and implement a coher-
ent, long-term litigation program:'15 More to 
the point, just as the NAACP sought an end 
to segregated public schools through a step-
by-step litigation strategy, CIR also sought to 
"find those institutions with programs that 
discriminate based on race, target them, get a 
victory, and parlay it into a larger strategy to 
challenge the entire consideration of race:'16 
Its initial target was the University of Texas 
law school. Not only did Texas make use of 
separate admissions pools for minority and 
nonminority applicants (making it "vulner-
able" to attack), Texas was also in the Fifth 
Circuit, where CIR thought that it had a bet-
ter chance of succeeding than in other federal 
courts of appeals. 17 
CrR won that case, Hopwood v. Texas . 
That 1996 decision, however, proved to be a 
pyrrhic victory. Texas retrofitted its admis-
sions scheme and, for a variety of reasons, 
the Court denied certiorari. IS Seven years 
later, the Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of race preferences at the University of 
Michigan law school in another CIR case, 
Grutter v. Bollinger. 
When CIR filed Grutter (and a companion 
case, Gratz v. Bollinger) in 1998, it had reason 
to be optimistic. In addition to Hopwood, CIR 
had just scored an important victory in litiga-
tion challenging Proposition 209, California's 
12 ]. Harvie Wilkinson III. FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT: SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 
1954-1978 at 64 (1979). 
13 Earl Warren. THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 291 (1977). 
14 A Brief History of CIR. available at www.cir-usa.org/history.html. 
IS Id. 
16 Charles]. Ogletree. Jr .• From Brown to Tulsa: Defining Our Own Future, 47 How. L.J. 499. 533 (2004). 
Hardly a fan of CIR'S agenda. Ogletree depicted CIR'S strategy as "frighteningly similar" to the NAACP'S 
building block approach. Id. 
17 David Segal. Putting Affirmative Action on Trial. WASH. POST. Feb. 20, 1998. See also Michael S. Greve. 
The Demise of Race-Based Admissions Policies. CHRON. OF HIGHER ED .• March 19. 1999 (CIR co-
founder describing Hopwood litigation as "an opening salvo" in a "larger strategy"). 
18 By 1996.Justices Kennedy and O'Connor regularly avoided ruling on cases raising divisive social issues. See 
Thomas W. Merrill. The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis. 47 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.]. 569 (2003). Furthermore. as suggested in a concurrence to the Court's cert denial. a decision assessing 
the legality of an affirmative action plan no longer in effect would open the Court up to charges of judicial 
overreaching. Texas v. Hopwood. 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (concurring opinion of Justices Ginsburgand Souter). 
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anti-affirmative action ballot initiative. And 
while the Supreme Court refused to hear 
Hopwood, the Justices had ruled in [995 that 
race preferences are subject to strict scrutiny 
review.19 Moreover, Michigan seemed a vul-
nerable target. Michigan lawmakers opposed 
to affirmative action had identified about 100 
potential plaintiffs, including Barbara Grut-
ter (a mother of two with high LSAT scores 
who owned her own health care consulting 
firm ) and Jennifer Gratz (a "camera ready" 
homecoming queen from a blue-collar fam-
ily with stellar grades and no apparent po-
liticalleanings).2o Also, Michigan made use 
of race-specific grids and charts when imple-
menting its undergraduate affirmative action 
scheme.21 
By the time the Supreme Court issued 
its ruling in Crutter, however, affirmative 
action seemed to have become entrenched. 
N ot only did the traditional allies of prefer-
ences continue to support affirmative action, 
Republican lawmakers backed away from ef-
fort s to undo race preferences. Republicans 
in the House and Senate, for example, voted 
down proposals to roll back federal affir-
mative-action programs. Recognizing that 
the GOP would need to attract the growing 
number of working women and Hispanic 
voters, Republican leadership thought it bet-
ter "to craft a positive message for minorities" 
19 Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
than risk harming itself at the polls.22 At the 
state leveL moreover, Republican lawmak-
ers perceived that their party was harmed 
by anti-preference ballot initiatives. By 2000, 
the populist revolt against affirmative action 
largely had fizzled in response to Republican 
party pressure.23 
From CIR'S perspective, the timing of the 
Crutter litigation was anything but optimal. 
With ever-diminishing elected official and 
interest group opposition to preferences, crR 
thought it had only one important ally, the 
Bush White House. 24 That ally, however, 
wound up distancing itself from crR. Indeed, 
for reasons I will now detaiL the biggest 
boost for affirmative action may well have 
come from George W. Bush. 
One day before his Justice Department 
filed a brief in the Michigan cases, the 
President announced that he "strongly 
support[ s ] diversity ... including racial di -
versity in higher education" but that the 
Michigan plans were at "their core" an uncon-
stitutional "quota system:'25 Consistent with 
these remarks, the Justice Department brief 
suggested that universities may make use of 
race preferences when race-neutral alterna-
tives are ineffective. In other words, unlike 
the Reagan and first Bush administrations 
(where the government argued that any con-
sideration of race was impermissible), the 
20 Segal, supra note 17; Jon athan Groner, Center Ring, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 9, 2002, National at r. 
21 The Court seized upon this fact in Gra tz , striking down the undergraduate scheme because it awarded 
a set number of poi nts [0 all minori ty applicants. 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2428-30 (2003). For reasons I have 
deta il ed elsewhere, Gra lz (when read [Ogether with Grutter ) places few limits on universities that want 
[0 employ t'lce preferences. See Nea l Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. 1. RE V. 347, 
376- 81 (2003) . 
22 Julier Eilperin, House D efeats Bill Targeting C ollege Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, May 7, 1998 at 
A4· 
23 See Alex Fryer, Affirmative Action Fight S hifts from Ballot Box [0 Courtroom, SEATTLE TIMES, N ov. 
25, 2002 at A r. 
24 With John Ashcroft (who opposed preferences in rhe U.S . Senate) serving as Attorney General and 
Ted O lson (who worked with CIR in the Hop wood litigation) serving as Solicitor General, CIR had good 
reason [0 think it could count on strong Justice D epartment backing. 
25 Remarks on the Michigan Affirmat ive Action Case, 39 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 71 (Jan . 15, 2003). 
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George W. Bush Justice Department sought 
to steer a middle path on preferences. 
By telling the Court that a "conservative 
president does not think that he can afford 
to stand unambiguously for colorblind-
ness;'26 Bush made clear how politically iso-
lated opponents of preferences had become. 
In so doing. Bush made it that much harder 
for the Justices - especially swing-Justices 
who typically pay close attention to social 
and political forces - to validate CIR'S posi-
tion. Moreover, even if the Court's swing 
Justices were predisposed to validating af-
firmative action, the Bush brief may have 
contributed to the Court's lopsided and 
sweeping approval of preferences.27 Equally 
significant, it is extremely unlikely that an-
other administration will seek the overturn-
ing of Grutter (through judicial filings or 
Court appointments). Just as the Truman 
brief in Brown operated as a constraint on 
subsequent administrations, the Bush brief 
in Grutter signals executive approval of race 
diversity. 
From CIR'S vantage, bad luck explains the 
Bush administrations rejection of their posi-
tion. The Bush brief was a direct response 
to racially insensitive remarks made by then-
Senate majority leader Trent Lott - remarks 
made about a month before the Bush brief 
was due to the Supreme Court. In December 
26 Negative Reaction, NAT·L. REv., Feb. 10, 2003 at 12. 
2002, Senator Lott appeared to embrace the 
segregationist appeals of Strom Thurmond's 
1948 presidential campaign. The President 
immediately denounced the Senator. More 
significantly, responding to political advisors 
who told him that he must do better with 
minority voters, the President looked for 
ways to convince voters that his denounce-
ment was sincere. His qualified embrace of 
affirmative action was the most visible way 
that the President distanced himself from 
the Lott imbroglio.28 
Grutter and Gratz, like the Brown opinions 
before them, underscore the pivotal role that 
luck plays in Supreme Court decisionmak-
ing. Just as the NAACP could not foresee Earl 
Warren becoming Chief Justice after the first 
round of oral arguments in Brown, CIR could 
not anticipate Trent Lott's remarks or the 
impact of those remarks on the Bush White 
House. Likewise, just as the NAACP litigation 
strategy allowed social and political forces to 
catch up to its arguments against segregation, 
CIR'S step-by-step litigation strategy had the 
unintended consequence of allowing majori-
tarian forces to coalesce in support of affir-
mative action.29 
What is amazing here is that Grutter 
and Brown are anything but anomalous. 
Advocates often find themselves sabo-
taged (as did CIR) or propelled forward 
27 In Crutter. six Justices explicitly approved of preferences. one expressed no opinion on the issue, and 
two explicitly rejected preferences. For a discussion of why I think the decision gives college and univer-
sity officials near carte blanche power to administer preferential treatment programs. see Devins. supra 
note 21 at 376-8I. 
28 For news stories detailing the Lott episode and its impact on the Bush brief, see Adam Nagourney. 
With His Eyes on Two Political Pri:z:es, the President Picks His Words Carefully, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2003 at A26; June Kronhol:z: .tiJ Jeanne Cummings. Bush Decries Racial Preferences. WALL ST. J.. Jan. 16. 
2003 at A4. 
29 Before the Supreme Court. these majoritarian forces were on display. No member of Congress submit-
ted a brief supporting CIR'S position. In sharp relief, briefs were filed in support of affirmative action by 
124 members of Congress. Likewise. 23 states backed the University of Michigan (with only one state, 
Florida. opposing race preferences). Finally, big business, unions. civil rights interests. and colleges and 
universities overwhelmingly backed the Michigan plans. See Devins. supra at 366-70. See also Carter 
G. Phillips, Was Affirmative Action Saved by its Friendsr. in Neal Devins .tiJ Davison M. Douglas eds., 
A YEAR AT THE SUPREME COURT 115-29 (2004). 
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(as did the NAACP) by unexpected events 
that take place after the Court grants cer-
tiorari. Consider, for example, Roe v. Wade 
and 2004 Supreme Court decisions limit-
ing presidential warmaking authority. Like 
Brown, Roe was a case where a change in 
the Court's personnel resulted in reargu-
ment and, ultimately, a different rationale. 
When Roe was first argued (in December 
1971), there were two vacancies on the 
Court - seats ultimately filled by William 
Rehnquist and Lewis Powell. At that time, 
a 5-2 majority found the Texas abortion 
statute unconstitutional. The case was as-
signed to Harry Blackmun, the most tenta-
tive of the majority Justices. A cover note 
to his draft opinion suggested that he was 
"flexible as to results;" Blackmun's draft opin-
ion, moreover, invalidated the Texas law on 
narrow "void for vagueness" grounds.3D 
Other Justices in the Roe majority would 
have preferred a more forceful opinion but 
did not want to run the risk of reargument 
(fearing that Blackmun would switch sides 
and that Powell and Rehnquist would join 
this group to form a five-member majority 
rejecting abortion rights). This effort failed, 
for Chief Justice Warren Burger strongly 
backed reargument - an event that prompt-
ed William O. Douglas to write a memo 
to the Justices complaining of Burger's 
"manipulat[ion):' For Douglas: "The plea that 
the cases be reargued is merely strategy by a 
minority somehow to suppress the majority 
view with the hope that exigencies of time 
will change the result:'31 Contrary to Burger's 
apparent intent, changes in the internal dy-
namics of the Court transformed Blackmun's 
mealy mouthed Roe draft into an absolutist 
pro-choice decision. In particular, Powell's 
prodding of Blackmun resulted in the Court's 
embrace of the highly controversial and now-
defunct trimester standard. 
No doubt, Burger and Douglas's battle 
over reargument in Roe did not anticipate 
Powell's role in the decision. For their part, 
pro-choice advocates in Roe could not fore-
see the Court's reargument let alone the 
proclivities of Justices who had not been 
confirmed when the case was first argued. 
Indeed, when the Court granted certiorari 
in Roe, Hugo Black and John Harlan seemed 
certain to participate in the case. For all these 
reasons, Roe's reasoning and landmark status 
are certainly tied to events outside the advo-
cates' controp2 
Events subsequent to the granting of cer-
tiorari and outside the advocates' control also 
figured prominently in this past term's war 
on terror decisions. Shortly after April 2004 
oral arguments, the world learned about the 
prisoner abuse scandal in Iraq. The photo-
graphs from Abu Ghraib prison highlighted 
the potential for abuse when the executive 
branch has unchecked authority over de-
tainees. More to the point, the prison scan-
dal cast doubt on the very arguments made 
by Deputy Solicitor General Paul Clement. 
Clement told the Justices that it's "the judg-
ment of [military officials] involved in this 
process that the last thing you want to do 
is torture somebody or try to do something 
30 David J. Garrow, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 547-48 (1994) (quoting Blackmun memo). Blackmun's 
draft opinion in the related Georgia case, Doe v. Bolton, more forcefully overturned Georgia's abortion 
statute. Id. at 549-51. That draft opinion, however, did not go as far as other Justices in the majority 
would have liked and did not come close to embracing the trimester standard that the Court ultimately 
adopted in Roe. Id. at 551. 
31 Id. at 555 (quoting Douglas memo). 
32 It should also be noted that the Roe litigation was anything but well thought out. Rather than a 
carefully drawn out plan from a national interest group, Roe was a grass roots, seat of the pants ef-
fort. See Neal Devins, The Countermajoritarian Paradox, 93 MICH. 1. REV. 1433, 1444-45 (1995). 
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along those lines:'33 Yet torture was clearly a 
fixture at Abu Ghraib. Further harming the 
administration's case, Justice Department 
memoranda that provided a legal justifica-
tion for the torturing of al Qaeda terrorists 
were disclosed by The Washington Post, New 
York Times, and other media outlets in May 
and June 2004.34 And if that was not enough, 
administration officials acknowledged in 
the midst of this imbroglio that interroga-
tion experts from the American detention 
camp at Guantanamo Bay trained military 
intelligence teams at Abu Ghraib (and that 
training included techniques utilized at 
Guantanamo).35 
Against this backdrop, it is little wonder 
that the Court concluded both that "a state 
of war is not a blank check for the president" 
and that "essential constitutional promises 
may not be eroded:'36 Two months earlier, 
when the Court heard oral arguments in these 
cases, there was little reason to expect such a 
rebuke of administration claims that "where 
the government is on a war footing. you have 
to trust the executive:'37 Traditionally, the 
Supreme Court has shown a reluctance to 
second-guess the decisions of elected offi-
cials in time of war. 38 Before the Abu Ghraib 
scandal, that tradition might have prompted 
judicial deference to executive and military 
judgments.39 And even if the Court would 
have ruled against the administration, the 
prison scandal and related developments 
may have prompted the Court's rebuke of 
administration efforts "to condense power:'40 
In critical respects, the administration 
made its bad luck in the war on terror cases. 
That is not to say that the prison scandal did 
not come as a surprise to administration of-
ficials. Justice Department attorneys defend-
ing the administration before the Supreme 
Court, in particular, were almost certainly 
unaware of Abu Ghraib (and, quite possibly, 
the torture memos). Otherwise, they would 
33 Respondent's statement during oral argument at so, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696, available at 
supreme.lp.lindlaw.com/ supreme_court/ docket/ 2003/ april.html. 
34 Dana Priest ~ R.Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justilication for Use of Torture. WASH. POST, June 8, 
2004 at AI; Neil A. Lewis, Justice Memo Explained How to Skip Prisoner Rights, N.Y. Times, May 21, 
2004 at AS. 
35 See Douglas Jehl ~ Andrea Elliot, Cuba Base Sent Its Interrogators to Iraqi Prison, WASH. POST, May 
28, 2004 at AS; Dana Priest ~ Bradley Graham, Guantanamo List Details Approved Interrogation 
Methods, WASH. POST, June 10, 2004 at AI3. 
36 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004). 
37 Petitioner's statement during oral argument at 23, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, No. 03-1027, available at su-
preme.lp.lindlaw.com/ supreme_court/ docket/ 2003/ april.html. 
38 Along with Lou Fisher, I have detailed the Court's growing reluctance to interfere with unilateral presi-
dential war making. See Devins ~ Fisher, supra note I. 
39 Absolutist arguments by the Bush administration in the war on terror cases might well have been 
tied to increasing judicial deference towards presidential war making. Following the prison scandal. 
however, the administration understood that social forces weighed against its arguments. In an ef-
fort to counter these forces, the administration sought to call attention to the risks of a Court rul-
ing limiting presidential power. On June I, Deputy Attorney General James Corney spoke of ad-
ministration efforts to play to the "court of public opinion" by releasing documents suggesting that 
enemy combatant Jose Padilla planned to detonate a radiological dirt bomb and to blow up apart-
ment buildings. Scott Turow, Trial by News Conference? No Justice in That, WASH. POST, June 13, 
2004 at BI (quoting Corney). For his part, President Bush sought to limit the damage of the Justice 
Department terror memo. On June 17, the White House released a 2002 presidential memorandum 
in which Bush "decline(d] to exercise" the powers that the Justice memo said he had, preferring in-
stead to abide by"the provisions of(the] Geneva (Conventions]:' "Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and 
Taliban Detainees;' memorandum of February 7, 2002 from President Bush to the Vice President et al. 
40 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2650 (emphasis in original). 
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never have said what they did during oral ar-
gument. For this very reason, the war on ter-
ror cases are cut from the same cloth as the 
other cases discussed in this essay. Events out-
side of the litigants' control - many of which 
happened after oral argument - shaped the 
social context and almost certainly the con-
tent of the Court's decisions. 
More than eighty years ago, Justice 
Cardozo reminded us that the 'great tides 
and currents which engulf the rest of men 
do not turn aside in their course and pass 
the judges by:'41 Skilled litigants can ride the 
crests of these tides and, in this way, help 
shape Court decisionmaking. Nevertheless, 
as both Grutter and Brown show, majoritar-
ian pressures ebb and flow - so that it is very 
hard to predict precisely when a multi-year 
litigation strategy should commence and 
precisely when litigants should go for the 
jugular by seeking Supreme Court review of 
the issue that matters most to them. Beyond 
majoritarian pressures, luck sometimes 
plays a prominent - perhaps decisive - role 
in Court decisionmaking. Indeed, after the 
Court grants certiorari (and sometimes after 
oral argument), the reasoning and outcome 
of Court decisions often seem to be a by-
product of events that no litigant can predict 
nor control. Grutter, Brown, Roe, and the war 
on terror cases are all examples of this phe-
nomenon. In all of these cases, the winning 
litigant can attest to the fact that being lucky 
is often better than being good. !1 
41 Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921). 
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